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NONPARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF RANDOM UTILITY MODELS: TESTING
YUICHI KITAMURA∗ AND JÖRG STOYE∗∗
Abstract. This paper develops and implements a nonparametric test of Random Utility Models
(RUM) using only nonsatiation and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) as restrictions
on individual level behavior, allowing for fully unrestricted unobserved heterogeneity. The main application is the test of the null hypothesis that a sample of cross-sectional demand distributions was
generated by a population of rational consumers. Thus, the paper provides a ﬁnite sample counterpart
to the classic theoretical analysis of McFadden and Richter (1991). To do so, it overcomes challenges
in computation and in asymptotic theory and provides an empirical application to the U.K. Household
Expenditure Survey. An econometric result of independent interest is a test for inequality constraints
when they are represented in terms of the rays of a cone rather than its faces.

1. Introduction
This paper develops new tools for the analysis of Random Utility Models (RUM). The leading
application is stochastic revealed preference theory, that is, the modeling of aggregate choice behavior
in a population characterized by individual rationality and unobserved heterogeneity. We test the
null hypothesis that a repeated cross-section of demand data was generated by such a population,
without restricting unobserved heterogeneity in any form whatsoever. Equivalently, we empirically
test McFadden and Richter’s (1991) Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference (ARSP, to be deﬁned
later), using only nonsatiation and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) as restrictions on
individual level behavior. Doing this is computationally challenging. We provide various algorithms
that can be implemented with reasonable computational resources. Also, new tools for statistical
inference for inequality restrictions are introduced in order to deal with the high-dimensionality and
non-regularity of the problem at hand.
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Let
u : RK
+ →R
denote a random utility function. In our preferred interpretation, randomness of u represents unobserved heterogeneity across individuals.1 Each consumer faces an income level and a price vector in
K
RK
+ . Normalizing income to 1, the budget set for each consumer can be denoted as B(p), p ∈ R+ ,

and the consumer’s choice is determined as
y = arg max u(y).
y∈B(p)

The econometrician observes a random sample of (y, p). In other words, she observes (a sample analog
of) choice probability
Pr(y ∈ Y | price is p)
for each Y ⊂ RK
+ . The question is whether (up to sampling uncertainty) these choice probabilities
can be rationalized as an outcome of RUM. Our approach can be brieﬂy described by the following
steps:
• The ﬁrst insight is that, although demand data are continuous, they can be discretized without
any loss of information as long as the set of budgets is ﬁnite. Thus, a random utility model of
demand on a ﬁnite set of budgets is really a model of discrete choice, though the number of
distinct choice objects can be large (up to 67 in our empirical application in Section 8). The
next steps of our approach immediately apply to choice problems that were discrete to begin
with.
• If there is a ﬁnite list of discrete choice problems, then there is a ﬁnite list of rational “choice
types.” Each such type is uniquely characterized by a rationalizable nonstochastic choice pattern.2 In realistic problem sizes, there are many such types (up to 177352 in our application),
and obtaining the list is computationally challenging. Some techniques for eﬃciently computing the list are an important part of our contribution.
• Think of every rational choice type as deﬁning a vector of degenerate choice probabilities over
discrete choice objects. Then a corresponding vector of nondegenerate choice probabilities is
1Random utility models were originally developed in mathematical psychology, and in principle, our results also apply

to stochastic choice behavior by an individual. However, in these settings it would frequently be natural to impose much
more structure than we do.
2Note that we do not restrict the distribution of the utility function u to be discrete. It is the fundamental nature of

our problem that enables us to convert it into a discrete problem, albeit a very high dimensional one.
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consistent with a random utility model iﬀ it is a convex combination of the degenerate ones.
We collect the latter into columns of a matrix; choice probabilities are then rationalizable
iﬀ they are in the column cone spanned by this matrix. The same insight informs our test
statistic, which will be weighted Euclidean distance of estimated choice probabilities from
this cone. In particular, it is computationally convenient to work with this cone and not the
polytope that is generated by explicitly imposing that choice probabilities must be proper
probabilities.
• The limiting distribution of the test statistic depends discontinuously on a high-dimensional
nuisance parameter. Such features have been studied extensively in the literature on moment
inequalities. However, our problem has characteristics which are not well studied in that
literature. In particular, we will eﬀectively test moment inequalities that jointly deﬁne a
convex cone, and this cone will be represented in terms of its spanning rays rather than its
faces. Moving from one representation to the other is computationally infeasible. We therefore
use the representation of the cone that emerges naturally in our problem and “tighten” it for
the purpose of bootstrap simulations. The procedure is similar in spirit to approaches proposed
by Andrews and Soares (2010), Bugni (2010), Canay (2010), and others. However, it is easy
to implement in our application and, more generally, will have practical appeal whenever the
representation of inequalities through a cone’s spanning rays is natural.
In summary, the present paper contributes to the literature by (i) showing that McFadden and
Richter’s ARSP, and in particular stochastic rationality of a population, can be tested nonparametrically, and developing computational tools to do so, and (ii) proposing a method based on “inequality
tightening” that works well for inequality testing in some settings where standard methods as in
Andrews and Soares (2010) or Bugni (2010) are hard to implement. We note that (ii) is also a contribution to speciﬁcation testing of partially identiﬁed moment inequalities models more generally,
namely in cases where the indirect moment inequalities as discussed here are the natural description
of a model. We will also brieﬂy explain how to carry out counterfactual analysis and intend to ﬂesh
out this part of the analysis in a companion paper.
2. Related Literature
In this section, we discuss the related literature on demand; related works in asymptotic theory
are more easily discussed after setting up the corresponding framework. We ﬁrst and foremost build
on the classic literature on (deterministic and stochastic) revealed preference. Inspired by Samuelson’s
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(1938) statement of the revealed preference paradigm, Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967; see also Varian
(1982)), and Richter (1966) delineated the precise content of utility maximization if one observes a
single consumer’s demand behavior. For our purposes, this content is embodied in the Strong Axiom of
Revealed Preference (SARP): The transitive closure of directly revealed preference must be acyclical.3
This approach was extended to random utility maximization by Block and Marschak (1960), Falmagne
(1978), McFadden and Richter (1991), and McFadden (2005). In particular, McFadden and Richter
show that the precise content of random utility maximization – or equivalently, of individual level
utility maximization in the presence of unrestricted, unobservable heterogeneity – is expressed by a
collection of inequalities collectively dubbed “Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference” (ARSP).
These ﬁndings resolve this paper’s questions “in the limit” when all identiﬁable quantities are
known. In this idealized setting, they allow one to decide with certainty whether a given demand
system or distribution of demands is rationalizable. In reality, estimators of these quantities might
fail to be rationalizable because of sampling variation, and one can merely test the hypothesis that
data might have been generated by a rational individual or population. For testing individual level
rationality, such a test was proposed by Epstein and Yatchew (1985).4 To the best of our knowledge,
we provide the ﬁrst such test for ARSP.
Perhaps the closest paper to ours in spirit is Manski (2007). In a simple, very abstract discrete
choice problem (the universal set of options is a ﬁnite and, in practice, small list), he analyzes essentially the same question as we do. In particular, he states the testing and extrapolation problems in the
abstract, solves them in simple examples, and outlines an approach to exact ﬁnite sample inference.
Further results for simple instances of the problem, including results on the degree of underidentiﬁcation of choice types, were provided by Sher et al. (2011). While we start from a continuous problem

3The aforecited papers subtly diﬀer in their handling of indiﬀerence. SARP characterizes rationality in the absence

of indiﬀerence; else, it is suﬃcient but not necessary. Richter (1966) characterizes rationality if indiﬀerence is revealed
through set-valued choice. The Afriat inequalities, or equivalently Varian’s (1982) Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP), characterize rationality if indiﬀerence is permitted but cannot be revealed through set-valued choice.
These diﬀerences do not matter in our setting. Observed choice is always unique, hence Richter’s (1966) axiom
collapses to SARP. Because nonsatiation will be assumed, GARP diﬀers from SARP only with respect to choice objects
that lie on the intersections of budget planes. With continuous demand on ﬁnitely many budgets, this case has zero
probability (and does not occur in our data). In cases where these subtleties do matter, it would be easy to adopt our
approach to any of these variations.
4See also the survey by Cherchye et al. (2009) and recent work by Dean and Martin (2013) or Echenique et al. (2011)

for other approaches to testing individual level rationality.
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and use asymptotic theory rather than exact inference, the settings become similar after our initial
discretization step. Our main contribution relative to these papers is to provide the computational
toolkit, as well as asymptotic theory, to handle problems of realistic size. Indeed, this toolkit was
recently employed for choice extrapolation by Manski (2013).
In a series of inﬂuential papers, Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003, 2008; BBC henceforth) develop a nonparametric approach to demand analysis based on Engel curves. They assume the
same observables as we do and apply their method to the British Family Expenditure Survey (FES),
to which we apply our method as well in Section 8. The core diﬀerence to our approach is that BBC
analyze one individual level demand system generated by nonparametric estimation of Engel curves.
This could be loosely characterized as revealed preference analysis of a representative consumer (and
in practice, given their speciﬁc estimation technique, of average demand). One possible foundation
for it was provided by Lewbel (2001), who gives conditions on the random part of a random utility
model that ensure integrability of expected demand. Lewbel’s (2001) assumptions therefore precisely
delineate one possible bridge between BBC’s assumptions and ours. Also, BBC exploit only the implications of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) and therefore test a necessary but
not suﬃcient condition for rationalizability of aggregate demand; see Blundell, Browning, Cherchye,
Crawford, de Rock, and Vermeulen (2012). In contrast, we consider the full implication of SARP. A
diﬀerent test of necessary conditions is proposed by Hoderlein (2011), who shows that certain features
of rational individual demand, like adding up and standard properties of the Slutsky matrix, are
inherited by aggregate demand under weak conditions. The resulting test is passed by the FES data.
Hoderlein and Stoye (2013) again use the same assumptions and data but ask diﬀerent questions. They bound from above and below the fraction of the population who violate WARP. As a
corollary (namely, by exhibiting the conditions under which the lower bound is zero), they show what
discipline is put on the data by WARP alone. In the very special case of two goods, their results are
formally connected to ARSP because WARP implies SARP (Rose (1958)), thus their corollary and
ARSP must have the same specialization. This specialization is developed, and some implications are
pointed out, in Stoye and Hoderlein (2013). The latter paper contains no asymptotic theory, and the
asymptotic theory in Hoderlein and Stoye (2013) is more closely related to the previous literature on
moment inequalities than to this paper’s innovation.
Finally, our approach can be usefully contrasted to the recently active literature on invertibility
of demand, that is, on conditions under which individual demand can be backed out from observation
of repeated cross-sections. See Beckert and Blundell (2007), Berry, Gandhi, and Haile (2013), and
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references therein. Unsurprisingly, invertibility requires substantial assumptions on structural parameters, i.e. utility functions and/or their distributions, which we avoid. The paper in this literature that
is perhaps closest to ours is Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2011), who investigate nonparametric
extrapolation of demand and, compared to our setting, essentially add only invertibility. Other than
by adding this assumption, their paper diﬀers from ours by restricting attention to two goods. The
extension of their approach to more than two goods is challenging; however, in the case of two goods,
Stoye and Hoderlein (2013) show that their invertibility assumption is without loss of generality given
the data structure.
3. Methodology
Following McFadden and Richter (1991) as well as many of the aforecited references, we presume
a ﬁnite number of budgets parameterized by p ∈ {p1 , ..., pJ }.5 Indexing the corresponding budget
planes as Bj = B(pj ) := {y ≥ 0 : p′j y = 1}, we can drop p from notation and write choice probability
functions as
π(y ∈ Y |Bj ) := Pr(y ∈ Y |budget plane is Bj ),

Y ⊂ Y.

We only restrict individual consumers’ behavior by monotonicity (“more is better”) and SARP;
equivalently, we assume that each consumer maximizes some nondecreasing utility function.6 The only
implication of monotonicity in our setting is that choices must be on (and not below) budget planes.
Thus, we assume that demand distributions are supported on the corresponding budget planes; more
formally, π(y ∈ Bj |Bj ) = 1. The only implication of SARP is to restrict, in possibly very intricate
ways, whether choice can simultaneously be above certain budgets and below others. In particular,
(
)
consider two consumers a and b whose choices yja and yjb are diﬀerent but fulﬁl p′j yka − 1 (p′j ykb −1) ≥ 0
for each (j, k) ∈ {1, ..., J}2 . In words, it is true for any (j, k) that consumer a’s choice from budget j
lies above budget k iﬀ consumer b́’s choice from budget j does. Then it must be the case that either
both consumers fulﬁl SARP or both violate it. For the purpose of testing our random utility model,
we can take the two consumers to form an equivalence class.
This insight means that, while the space of choices Y ⊂ RK
+ is generally unrestricted and is
continuous in our application, it can be discretized without loss of generality. Doing so requires some
5The theory was extended to the continuous case in McFadden (2005), and we discuss prospects for the corresponding

extension of our approach in the conclusion.
6In a setting characterized by choice from linear budgets, this is furthermore equivalent to assuming maximization of

strictly concave utility (Varian (1982)).
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{
}
deﬁnitions. For every budget Bj , let the Ij elements of x1|j , . . . , xIj |j form the coarsest partition of
Bj such that no budget plane other than Bj intersects the interior of any one element of the partition.
{
}
Ij
∪
In other words, x1|j , . . . , xIj |j has the property that its elements are disjoint, that Bj =
xi|j
i=1

for every j, and also that for any k = 1, ..., J, any i = 1, ..., Ij , and any y1 , y2 ∈ xi|j , one has
{
}
(p′k y1 − 1)(p′k y2 − 1) ≥ 0; furthermore, x1|j , . . . , xIj |j is the coarsest such partition. Henceforth, we
use the word “patch” to denote a generic element xi|j of X . For the simplest nontrivial example, let
there be J = 2 budgets that intersect, then there is a total of four patches: two on B1 , where one is
above B2 and the other one is below it, and two patches on B2 , where one is above B1 and one is below
it. Then the random utility model intricately restricts the probabilities of patches π(y ∈ xi|j |Bj ), but
it does not at all restrict the conditional distributions of demand on patches.
We can, therefore, work with choice space X , eﬀectively discretizing the choice problem to one
∑
with a total of I := Jj=1 IJ choice objects and corresponding choice probabilities. This leaves us
with a large (in applications of practical interest) but ﬁnite set of distinct nonstochastic choice types.
We will now explain how to eﬃciently encode these. To do so, arrange X as a vector
X = (x1|1 , x2|1 , ..., xIJ |J )′
and similarly write
πi|j := Pr(y ∈ xi|j |Bj ),
πj := (π1|j , ..., πIj |j )′
π := (π1′ , ..., πJ′ )′ = (π1|1 , π2|1 , ..., πIJ |J )′ ,
then the I-vector π contains all information that is relevant for testing RUM.
Any conceivable pattern of nonstochastic choice behavior can be identiﬁed with a binary Ivector a = (a1|1 , ..., aIJ |J )′ , where a component ai|j of a equals 1 iﬀ the corresponding component
xi|j of X is chosen from budget Bj . We call a rationalizable if there exists u∗ ∈ U such that ai|j =
1{arg maxy∈Bj u∗ (x) ∈ xi|j } for all ai|j . Under our assumptions, this is the case iﬀ behavior encoded in
a fulﬁlls SARP, but we emphasize that the approach could be modiﬁed to impose more or less structure
on a and thereby on agents’ behavior. Every rationalizable vector a can be thought of as characterizing
a rational, nonstochastic choice type. Let the columns of the (I × H)-matrix A := [a1 , ..., aH ] collect
all rationalizable such vectors. Then a vector of choice probabilities π is stochastically rational iﬀ
there exists ν ∈ ∆H−1 such that Aν = π. In words, π must be a convex combination of the columns
of A. The weights ν can be interpreted as implied population distribution over rational choice types;
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remember, though, that each of these choice types represents an equivalence class of observationally
distinct choice types.
To compare our assumptions with those inherent in other approaches, observe how invertibility
of demand fails on many levels. First, we consider ﬁnitely many budgets, so with unconstrained heterogeneity, any given demand pattern is rationalizable iﬀ it is rationalizable by inﬁnitely many utility
functions. Second, every column a represents a continuum of observationally distinct, rationalizable
demand patterns because of the lumping of continuous demand data into patches. Third, ν is not
identiﬁed: A is typically very far from full column rank, and a π that is rationalizable at all will
typically be rationalizable by many diﬀerent vectors ν. We return to partial identiﬁcation of ν in
section 9.1.
McFadden and Richter (1991; see also McFadden (2005, theorem 3.3)) anticipated the discretization of choice space and also also noted various equivalent statements for the empirical content
of RUM. For example, ν as required here exists iﬀ the linear program minν≥0,s≥0 1′I s s.t. Aν + s ≥
π, 1′H ν ≤ 1 has an optimal solution with s = 0. However, we employ the ﬁrst statement verbalized
above, thus we directly test:

(HA ):

There exist a ν ∈ ∆H−1 such that Aν = π,

where ∆H−1 denotes the (H − 1)-dimensional unit simplex. To test this hypothesis, we transform it
as follows. First, note that 1′I A = [J, ..., J] and 1′I π = J hold by deﬁnition. Therefore, Aν = π implies
1′H ν = 1. Thus (HA ) is equivalent to
(HB ): There exist ν ≥ 0 such that Aν = π.

It is easy to see that Hypothesis (HB ) is, in turn, equivalent to

(HC ):

minη∈C [π − η]′ Ω[π − η] = 0,

where Ω is a positive deﬁnite matrix (restricted to be diagonal in our inference procedure) and C :=
{Aν|ν ≥ 0}. Note that the constraint set C is a cone in RI . The solution η0 of (HC ) is the projection
√
of π ∈ RI+ onto C under the weighted norm ∥x∥Ω = x′ Ωx. The corresponding value of the objective
function is the squared length of the projection residual vector. The projection η0 is unique, but the
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corresponding ν is not. Stochastic rationality holds if and only if the length of the residual vector is
zero.
A natural sample counterpart of the objective function in (HC ) would be minη∈C [π̂−η]′ Ω[π̂−η],
where π̂ estimates π, for example by sample choice frequencies. It is useful to normalize this sample
counterpart by N to obtain an appropriate asymptotic distribution, so deﬁne
(3.1)

JN

:

= N min[π̂ − η]′ Ω[π̂ − η]
η∈C

= N min [π̂ − Aν]′ Ω[π̂ − Aν].
ν∈RH
+

Once again, ν is not unique at the optimum, but η = Aν is. Call its optimal value η̂, noting that
η̂ can also be thought of as rationality-constrained estimator of choice probabilities. Then η̂ = π̂,
and JN = 0, iﬀ the estimated choice probabilities π̂ are stochastically rational; obviously, our null
hypothesis will be accepted in this case. To determine an appropriate critical value for our test, we
will have to estimate the distribution of JN . This estimation problem is intricate and will be handled
in section 5.

4. Computation
We now turn to computational implementation of the approach. The challenge is threefold:
First, how to encode the choice set X ; second, how to generate the matrix A; last, how to carry out
the constrained minimization in the deﬁnition of JN . We explain our response to these issues in this
order.
4.1. Encoding X . Geometrically, the patches xi|j are polyhedra with rather complex descriptions.
However, the only information that matters for computing A is how any given patch relates to the
diﬀerent budgets. To implement this insight, we switch from the double index expression X =
I

j
{{xi|j }i=1
}Jj=1 to a a single index i = 1, ..., I and write X = {xi }Ii=1 in the remainder of this sec-

tion. Now, let




−1 if xi is below Bj


Xij :=

0 if xi is on Bj



 +1 if xi is above Bj

j = 1, ..., J,

then we can represent each xi by the vector
Xi := [Xi1 , ..., XiJ ],

i = 1, ..., I.

10

KITAMURA AND STOYE

The choice set is represented by the (I × J)-matrix X= [X ′1 , ...,X ′I ]′ with typical cell Xij . Our algorithm for generating X from budget data (p1 , ..., pJ ) is as follows: First, generate all J × 2J−1 possible
vectors Xi of the form just described. Not all of these will encode patches that actually exist in the
given choice problem; in particular, some of them will deﬁne intersections of half-spaces that do not
occur in the positive quadrant. Thus, test the validity of each vector and append it to X only if the
test is passed. To illustrate this step, suppose that J = 5 with K goods and that we want to verify
whether the patch encoded by (0, −1, 1, 1, 1) exists. It is easy to see that this is the case iﬀ the system
of (J + 1 + K) inequalities
p′1 y ≤ 1, p′1 y ≥ 1, p′2 y ≤ 1, p′3 y ≥ 1, p′4 y ≥ 1, p′5 y ≥ 1, y ≥ 0
has a solution. Several numerical solvers can quickly verify consistency of a set of linear inequality
constraints. Using the cvx optimization package (Grant and Boyd (2008, 2011)), we ﬁnd that checking
the above inequalities is computationally inexpensive even for high dimensional commodity spaces.7
4.2. Computing A. To compute the matrix A, write
A = {aih },
where aih equals 1 if choice type h picks patch xi from budget Bj , where Bj contains xi . (As with
X , it is convenient for this section’s purpose to index rows of A by i = 1, ..., I instead of the double
index i|j.) The challenge is to ensure that a nonstochastic choice type is represented as a column of A
iﬀ her choices are rationalizable, i.e. iﬀ the (transitive closure of the) incomplete preference ordering
revealed by her choice behavior is acyclical. To do this, we ﬁrst extract the preferences revealed by
a choice type, then check for acyclicity. The following fact is crucial for the ﬁrst step: Choice of xi
from budget Bj reveals that xi ≻ xm for every patch xm ̸= xj s.t. Xmj ∈ {−1, 0} (the symbol ≻
signiﬁes the revealed preference relation). Here, Xmj = 0 ⇒ xi ≻ xm follows directly because xi
and xm are on the same budget plane; Xmj = −1 ⇒ xi ≻ xm follows by additional uses of “more
is better” and transitivity because xi was chosen over some patch that dominates xm . In a second
step, acyclicity of a given set of revealed preferences can be checked by the Floyd-Warshall algorithm,
eﬃcient implementations of which are readily available.
7If this computation were a bottleneck, it could be reﬁned along the lines of the decision tree crawling algorithm

discussed in the next subsection. However, computation of A is the much harder step.
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We implemented
three ways to generate A.8 First, a “brute force” approach initially creates
)
J
∏
I×
Ij -matrix Amax that represents all possible choice combinations from J budgets. Every

(
a

j=1

column of Amax is then checked for rationality. This approach, which resembles our computation of X,
has the beneﬁt of being straightforward and of also collecting irrational types, which can be handy for
simulations. However, the number of columns of Amax grows extremely rapidly as budgets are added,
and the brute force approach is not practical in realistic examples, including this paper’s empirical
application.
Our second approach is a “decision tree crawling” algorithm. Here, the core insight is that all
possible choice patterns can be associated with terminal nodes of a decision tree whose initial node
corresponds to choice from B1 , the next set of nodes to choice from B2 , and so on. The algorithm
exhaustively crawls this tree, checking for choice cycles at every node that is visited and abandoning
the entire branch whenever a cycle is detected. A column of A is discovered every time that a
terminal node is visited without detecting a cycle. The abandoning of branches means that most
nonrationalizable choice patterns are never visited. For example, if a cycle is detected after specifying
behavior on 4 out of 10 budgets, then none of the many possible completions of this choice pattern
are considered. The downside is more frequent (for any rational pattern that is detected) execution
of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm, but this algorithm is cheap (it terminates in polynomial time). The
net eﬀect is to improve computation time by orders of magnitude in complicated problems. Indeed,
this is our most powerful algorithm that is directly applicable “oﬀ the shelf” in every application of
our approach.
Finally, a modest amount of problem-speciﬁc adjustment can lead to further, dramatic improvement in many cases, including our empirical application. The key to this is contained in the
following proposition, which is established in appendix A.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that for some M ≥ 1, none of (B1 , ..., BM ) intersect BJ . Suppose also
that choices from (B1 , ..., BJ−1 ) are jointly rationalizable. Then choices from (B1 , ..., BJ ) are jointly
rationalizable iﬀ choices from (BM +1 , ..., BJ ) are.
This proposition is helpful whenever not all budgets mutually intersect. To exploit it in applications, one must manually check for such sets of budgets and possibly be willing to reorder budgets.
The beneﬁt is that if the proposition applies, all rationalizable choice patterns can be discovered by
8Appendix B contains a more detailed description, including pseudo-code for some algorithms.
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checking for rationalizable choice patterns on smaller domains and then combining the results. In particular, Proposition 4.1 informs the following strategy: First collect all rationalizable choice patterns
on (BM +1 , ..., BJ−1 ). Next, for each such pattern, ﬁnd all rationalizable completions of it to choice on
(B1 , ..., BJ−1 ) as well as all rationalizable completions to (BM +1 , ..., BJ ). (For the ﬁrst of these steps,
one may further economize by computing all rationalizable patterns on (B1 , ..., BM ) in a preliminary
step.) Every combination of two such completions is itself a rationalizable choice pattern. Note that
no step in this algorithm checks rationality on J budgets at once; furthermore, a Cartesian product
structure of the set of rationalizable choice patterns is exploited. The potential beneﬁt is substantial
– in our application, the reﬁnement sometimes improves computation times by orders of magnitude.
4.3. Computing JN . Computation of JN is a quadratic programming problem subject to a possibly
large number of linear inequality constraints. We have nothing to add to the theory of solving
such problems and rely on modern numerical solvers that can handle high-dimensional quadratic
programming problems. Our currently preferred implementation utilizes

cvx.

We also implemented

computation of JN with fmincon (using stepwise quadratic programming) and Knitro. All solvers
agree on those problems that they can handle, with fmincon being practical only for rather small
problem sizes.
4.4. Summary. As we will demonstrate in Section 8, the above algorithms for computation of X,
A, and JN can be executed for high-dimensional problems. However, we will now illustrate by very
brieﬂy going over the simplest nontrivial example, i.e. two budgets which intersect. In this case J = 2
and I1 = I2 = 2, yielding I = 4 patches,



0 −1
1






 0
 0
1 
, A = 
X=



 −1
 0
0 



1
0
1

and we have


0 0
Pr(x1 is




 Pr(x2 is
1 1 
, π = 


 Pr(x3 is
0 1 


1 0
Pr(x4 is


chosen|budget is B1 )



chosen|budget is B1 ) 
.

chosen|budget is B2 ) 

chosen|budget is B2 )

Here, the ﬁrst row of X represents the part of budget B1 that is below B2 and so on. Rows of A
corresponds to rows of X, whereas its columns correspond to types. Thus, the ﬁrst column of A
indicates the rational choice type whose choice from B1 is below B2 but whose choice from B2 is
above B1 . There are four logically possible choice types, but one of them, namely [1, 0, 1, 0]′ , would
violate WARP and is therefore not represented in A. Given an estimator π
b = (b
π1 , π
b2 , π
b3 , π
b4 )′ for π
and setting Ω = I2 , one can then verify that JN = N · (max{b
π1 + π
b3 − 1, 0})2 . In particular, the
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test statistic JN is zero if π
b1 + π
b3 ≤ 1, and in that case we immediately conclude that the data are
consistent with the random utility model.
The example reproduces the known ﬁnding (Matzkin (2006), Hoderlein and Stoye (2013)) that
with two budgets, the content of stochastic rationality is exhausted by the restriction “π1 + π3 ≤ 1”
on population choice probabilities. However, the tools proposed here allow one to perform similar
computations for very complicated examples. Think of the size of A, that is, “number of patches ×
number of rational choice types,” as an indicator of problem complexity. Then the example just given
has size (4 × 3). For our empirical application, we successfully computed A, and computed JN 2000
times, in cases where A has size (67 × 149570) respectively (64 × 177352). The computational bottlenecks in implementation are twofold: Computation of A took several hours in some cases (although
reduced to minutes using proposition 4.1), and computation of JN (which must be iterated over to
compute critical values) took up to a minute.

5. Inference
This section discusses inferential procedures to deal with the hypothesis (HA ) or its equivalent
forms. We initially assume that choice probabilities were estimated by sample frequencies. For each
budget j, denote the choices of Nj individuals, indexed by n = 1, ..., Nj , from the budget set Bj , by


 1 if individual n chooses xi|j
di|j,n =
n = 1, ..., NJ .

 0 otherwise
I

N

j
j
Assume that one observes J random samples {{di|j,n }i=1
}n=1
, j = 1, 2, ..., J. For later use, deﬁne



dj,n


d1|j,n


..


:= 
,
.


dIj |j,n

N=

J
∑

NJ .

j=1

An obvious way to estimate the vector π is to use choice frequencies
(5.1)

π̂i|j =

Nj
∑

di|j,n /Nj , i = 1, ..., Ij , j = 1, ..., J.

n=1

Our main task is to estimate the sampling distribution of JN = N minν∈RH [π̂ − Aν]′ Ω[π̂ − Aν] under
+

the null hypothesis that the true π is rationalizable. This problem is closely related to the literature
on inequality testing, but with an important twist. Recall that {a1 , a2 , ..., aH } are the column vectors
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of A. Deﬁne
cone(A) = {ν1 a1 + ... + νH aH : νh ≥ 0},
then C = cone(A), and we test whether π ∈ C. We therefore work with what is called a Vrepresentation of the cone C in the literature on convex geometry (see, e.g., Ziegler (1995)). Unfortunately, a V-representation is not useful in detecting whether η̂ is close to an irregular point or
not. (Irregular points occur close to the spanning rays of the cone, but because many vectors ν correspond to the same projection η̂, we may not be able to diagnose this from the ν that we discovered.)
Thus, an alternative description of C in terms of η has to be obtained. Weyl’s Theorem guarantees
that that is possible theoretically: If a set C in RJ is represented as cone(A), A ∈ RI×H , we can write
C = {t ∈ RI |Bt ≤ 0} for some B ∈ Rm×I .
The last line is called an H-representation of C.9 Applying Weyl to the deﬁnition of JN , one can
obtain
JN =

min

t∈RI :Bt≤0

N [π̂ − t]′ Ω[π̂ − t],

where the optimal t (:= t̂) is unique.
On a theoretical level, this connects our testing problem to tests of
H0 : Bθ ≥ 0

B ∈ Rp×q is known

based on test statistics of form
TN := minq N [B θ̂ − η]′ S −1 [B θ̂ − η].
η∈R+

This type of problem has been studied by Gourieroux, Holly and Monfort (1982) and Wolak (1991).
See also Chernoﬀ (1954), Kudo (1963), Perlman (1969), Shapiro (1988), Kuriki and Takemura (2000),
Andrews (2001), Rosen (2008), and Guggenberger, Hahn, and Kim (2008).10 A common way to
get a critical value for TN is to consider the least favorable case, which is θ = 0. This strategy is
9The converse is also true and known as Minkowski’s Theorem. See Gruber (2007), Grünbaum (2003) and Ziegler

(1995) for these results and other materials concerning convex polytopes used in this paper.
10More precisely, Guggenberger, Hahn and Kim (2008) consider speciﬁcation testing of linear moment inequality

models of the form Cθ ≤ E[x], θ ∈ Rm where C is a known conformable matrix, and propose to test its equivalent form
RE[x] ≥ 0 where R is another known matrix. This equivalence follows from the Weyl-Minkowski Theorem, which we
use as well. Moving from C to R is not computationally feasible in our application, however, and we avoid it. Similarly,
Canay’s (2010) inequality tightening is related to our method, but applying it here would require the H-representation
of C, which is not in practice available.
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inappropriate in the present context for a number of reasons: Direct application to our problem is
not feasible because the H-representation of C cannot be computed in practice, and the suggested
least favorable distribution can lead to unnecessarily conservative inference. Alternatively, one might
consider a resampling method. However, some care is required in calculating a valid critical value
for JN in cases where more than one inequality is (almost) binding. The naive bootstrap and like
methods fail in these cases. (See, for example, Andrews and Soares (2010), Bugni (2010), Canay
(2010), Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007), Imbens and Manski (2004), Romano and Shaikh
(2010), and Stoye (2009).)
Three methods for inference that can be potentially used to calculate a critical value for the
statistic JN are: (1) Regularization, (2) moment selection, and (3) “inequality tightening.” We now
√
discuss them in turn. Suppose that N (π̂ − π) →d N (0, S), where S is the asymptotic covariance matrix. Let Ŝ denote a consistent estimator for S. Then regularization is easy to imple√
ment. Let η̃αN := η̂ + αNN N (0, Ŝ), where αN is a sequence that goes to inﬁnity slowly. Recall that η̂ is the projection of the choice frequency vector π̂ onto the cone C. The random variable η̃αN is essentially a subsampled or m-out-of-n bootstrapped version of η̂. The distribution of
J˜N (αN ) :=

N
αN

minν∈RH [η̃αN − Aν]′ Ω[η̃αN − Aν] can be evaluated by simulation. It provides a valid
+

approximation of the distribution of JN asymptotically, regardless of the position of η0 , the population analog of η̂, on the cone C. This is basically the idea behind subsampling and the m-out-of-n
bootstrap. It is convenient computationally, but Andrews and Guggenberger (2009, 2010) forcefully
argue that it can suﬀer from severe conservatism.
The second approach, i.e. inequality selection, is essentially the Generalized Moment Selection
procedure for moment inequality models (see, e.g., Andrews and Soares (2010), Bugni (2010)). Let
κN be a sequence that diverges slowly to inﬁnity.11 Let b1 , ..., bm be the row vectors of B. Suppose
√
√
√
√
(w.l.o.g.) that − N b1 t̂ ≤ κN , ..., − N bf t̂ ≤ κN and − N bf +1 t̂ ≥ κN , ..., − N bm t̂ ≥ κN . Let
B1 = [b′1 , ..., b′f ]′ and B2 = [b′f +1 , ..., b′m ]′ . Redo the above minimization, but change the constraints to
min

t∈RI :B1 t=0,B2 t≤0

N [π̂ − t]′ Ω[π̂ − t].

Let t̂select denote the minimizer and deﬁne η̃κN := t̂select +
J˜n (κN ) =

min

t∈RI :Bt≤0

√1 N (0, Ŝ).
N

The distribution of

N [η̃κN − t]′ Ω[η̃κN − t].

11For example, Andrews and Soares (2010) suggest κ = √log N .
N
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oﬀers a valid approximation to the distribution of JN . This is expected to work well in ﬁnite samples,
but is computationally infeasible in the present context. To our knowledge, implementing Weyl’s
Theorem to obtain an H-representation out of the V-representation is done by repeated application
of (some variation of) the Fourier-Motzkin elimination algorithm, which is notoriously diﬃcult when
the dimension of ν is high. This is exactly the case for the problem considered in this subsection, even
for a small number of budgets.
We therefore propose an “inequality tightening” approach that sidesteps the need for an Hrepresentation of C, making it simple to implement and applicable to problems of a realistic size. The
idea is to tighten the constraint by replacing
ν≥0
with
ν ≥ τN 1H
for some positive scalar τN that declines to zero slowly. (In principle, the vector 1H could be any
strictly positive H-vector, though a data based choice of such a vector is beyond the scope of the
paper.) Now solve
JN (τN )

= min N [π̂ − η]′ Ω[π̂ − η]

:

η∈CτN

=

min

[ν−τN 1H ]∈RH
+

N [π̂ − Aν]′ Ω[π̂ − Aν]

where CτN := {Aν|ν ≥ τN 1H }, and let η̂τN denote the solution. Our proof establishes that constraints
that are almost binding at the original problem’s solution (i.e., their slack is diﬃcult to be distinguished
from zero at the sample size) will be binding with zero slack after tightening. Let η̃τN := η̂τN +
√1 N (0, Ŝ).
N

Notice that, as in the inequality selection procedure, no regularization (or subsampling/m-

out-of-n bootstrapping) is necessary at this stage. Finally, deﬁne
(5.2)

J˜N (τN )

:
=

= min N [η̃τN − η]′ Ω[η̃τN − η]
η∈CτN

min

[ν−τN 1H ]∈RH
+

N [η̃τN − Aν]′ Ω[η̃τN − Aν],

and use its distribution to approximate that of JN . This has the same theoretical justiﬁcation as the
inequality selection procedure. Unlike the latter, however, it avoids the use of an H-representation,
thus oﬀering a computationally feasible empirical testing procedure for stochastic rationality. We now
turn to providing a detailed justiﬁcation for the method.
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First, recall that we tighten the constraint set C using its V-representation. The next lemma,
among other things, shows that this corresponds to a strict tightening of its H-representation, even
though direct computation of the latter is infeasible. For a matrix B, let col(B) denote its column
space.
Lemma 5.1. For a τ > 0 and a matrix A ∈ RI×H , deﬁne
Cτ := {Aν|ν ≥ τ 1H }.
Then Cτ can be alternatively written as
Cτ = {t : Bt ≤ −τ ϕ},
where B ∈ Rm×I , ϕ ∈ Rm
++ and ϕ ∈ col(B).
This is diﬀerent from the Minkowski-Weyl theorem for polyhedra, which would provide an
expression of Cτ as the Minkowski sum of a convex hull and a non-negative hull. Lemma 5.1 is useful
for proving the asymptotic validity of our procedure.
The following assumption is used for our asymptotic theory.
Assumption 5.1. For all j = 1, ..., J,

Nj
N

→ ρj as N → ∞, where ρj ∈ (0, 1).

Let bk,i , k = 1, ..., m, i = 1, ..., I denote the (k, i) element of B, then deﬁne
bk (j) = [bk,N1 +···Nj−1 +1 , bk,N1 +···Nj−1 +2 , ..., bk,N1 +···Nj ]′
for 1 ≤ j ≤ J and 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Consider the following requirement:
Condition 5.1. For some ϵ > 0 and some j = 1, ..., J, var(bk (j)′ dj,n ) ≥ ϵ holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
Note that the distribution of observations is uniquely characterized by the vector π. Let P denote the
set of all π’s that satisfy Condition 5.1 for some (common) value of ϵ.
Theorem 5.1. Choose τN so that τN ↓ 0 and

√

N τN ↑ ∞. Also, let Ω be diagonal, where all the

diagonal elements are positive. Then under Assumption 5.1
lim inf inf Pr{JN ≤ ĉ1−α } = 1 − α
N →∞ π∈P∩C

where ĉ1−α is the 1 − α quantile of J˜N (τN ), 0 ≤ α ≤ 21 .
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Proof : See Appendix A.
Technically, the boundedness of our observations dj,n — each element of di|j,n is a Bernoulli(πi|j )
random variable — and the above condition guarantee that the Lindeberg condition holds for b′k π̂, k =
1, ..., m, which is important for the uniform size control result in the following theorem as it relies
on a triangular array CLT. It is known that a triangular array XiN , i = 1, ..., N ∼iid Bernoulli(pN ),
N = 1, 2, ... obeys CLT iﬀ N pN (1 − pN ) → ∞. Since the size control here is deﬁned against a ﬁxed
class of distribution F ∩ C as N → ∞, it seems natural to impose a ﬁxed lower bound ϵ in Condition
5.1. See the proof of Theorem 5.1 in Appendix A for more on this point.
Finally, we note that the method works because tightening the cone can only turn non-binding
inequalities from the H-representation into binding ones but not vice versa. This feature is not
universal to cones. Our proof establishes that it generally obtains if Ω is the identity matrix and all
corners of the cone are acute. In this paper’s application, we can further exploit the cone’s geometry
to extend the result to any diagonal Ω. Our method immediately applies to other V-representations
if analogous features can be veriﬁed.
6. Bootstrap Algorithm with Tightening
This section details how to simulate the distribution of JN with a bootstrap procedure that
employs Theorem 5.1. First, we apply the standard nonparametric bootstrap to obtain resampled
unrestricted choice probability vector estimates π̂ ∗(r) , r = 1, ..., R, where R denotes the number of
bootstrap replications. This provides the bootstrap distribution estimate as the distribution of π̂ ∗(r) −
π̂, r = 1, ..., R, where, as before, π̂ denotes the unrestricted choice probability vector. We need to
generate the bootstrap samples under the null, however. A naive way to achieve this would be to
center it around the restricted estimator η̂, that is
∗(r)

π̂naive = π̂ ∗(r) − π̂ + η̂,

r = 1, ..., R.

Recall that η̂ is the solution to
JN

:= N min[π̂ − η]′ Ω[π̂ − η]
η∈C

=

N min [π̂ − Aν]′ Ω[π̂ − Aν].
ν∈RH
+

∗
But π̂naive
is invalid due to standard results about the failure of the bootstrap in discontinuous models

(e.g., Andrews (2000)). The “tightening” remedy is to center it instead around the tightened restricted
estimator. More precisely, our procedure is as follows:
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(i) Obtain the τN -tightened restricted estimator η̂τn , which solves
JN

:=
=

min N [π̂ − η]′ Ω[π̂ − η]

η∈CτN

min

[ν−τN 1H ]∈RH
+

N [π̂ − Aν]′ Ω[π̂ − Aν]

(ii) Calculate the bootstrap estimators under the restriction, using the recentering factor η̂τn
obtained in (i):

π̂τ∗(r)
:= π̂ ∗(r) − π̂ + η̂τn ,
n

r = 1, ..., R.

(iii) Calculate the bootstrap test statistic by solving the following problem:

∗(r)

JN (τN ) :=
=

− η]′ Ω[π̂τ∗(r)
− η]
min N [π̂τ∗(r)
n
n

η∈CτN

min

[ν−τN 1H ]∈RH
+

N [π̂τ∗(r)
− Aν]′ Ω[π̂τ∗(r)
− Aν],
n
n

for r = 1, ..., R.
∗(r)

(iv) Use the empirical distribution of JN (τN ), r = 1, ..., R to obtain the critical value for JN .

This method relies on a tuning parameter τN which plays the role of a similar tuning parameter
in the moment selection approach (namely, the parameter labeled κN in Andrews and Soares (2010)).
In a simpliﬁed procedure in which the unrestricted choice probability estimate is obtained by simple
sample frequencies, one reasonable choice would be
√
τN =

log N
N

where N is the minimum of the ‘sample size’ across budgets: N = minj Nj (Nj is the number
of observations on Budget Bj : see (5.1)). The logarithmic penalization corresponds to the Bayes
Information Criterion. The use of N can probably be improved upon, but suﬃces to ensure validity
of our inference.
7. Test statistic with smoothing
In our empirical analysis in Section 8, the estimator π̂ is a standard kernel estimator, so the
above formula needs to be modiﬁed. Let hN (j) be the bandwidth applied to Budget Bj . Then an
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appropriate choice of τN is obtained by replacing Nj in the deﬁnition above with the “eﬀective sample
size” Nj hN (j). That is:

√
τN =

log N h
Nh

where N h = minj Nj hN (j). Strictly speaking, asymptotics with nonparametric smoothing involve
bias, and the bootstrap does not solve the problem. A standard procedure is to claim that one used
undersmoothing and can hence ignore the bias. We follow this convention.
To formally state the asymptotic theory behind our procedure with smoothing, let x(j) denote
{(
)}Nj
Ij
the median (log) income levels for year j. We observe J random samples
{di|j }i=1
, xn (j)
,j =
n=1

1, ..., J. Instead of sample frequency estimators, we use
∑Nj
xn (j)−x(j)
n=1 K( hN (j) )di|j,n
,
π̂i|j =
∑Nj
xn (j)−x(j)
)
K(
n=1
hN (j)
π̂j

= (π̂1|j , ..., π̂Ij |j )′ ,

π̂ = (π̂1′ , ..., π̂J′ )′ ,
(note the index j in di|j,n now refers to year), where xn (j) is the log income of person n, 1 ≤ n ≤ Nj
observed in year j. The kernel function K is assumed to be symmetric about zero, to integrate to
∫
∫
1, and to satisfy |K(z)|dz < ∞ and z 2 K(z)dz < ∞. Needless to say, π̂i|j is a standard kernel
regression estimator for
πi|j := pi|j (x(j))
where
pi|j (x) := Pr(di|j,n = 1|xn (j) = x).
As before, we write πj := (π1|j , ..., πIj |j )′ and π := (π1′ , ..., πJ′ )′ = (π1|1 , π2|1 , ..., πIJ |J )′ . The smoothed
version of JN is computed using the above kernel estimator for π̂ in (3.1). We also replace the
normalizing factor N with N minj hN (j), which is convenient for asymptotic analysis. Likewise,
J˜N (τN ) is obtained applying the same replacements to the formula (5.2), although generating η̃τN
requires a slight modiﬁcation. Let η̂τN (j) be the j-th block of the vector η̂τN , and Ŝj be a consistent
√
estimator for the asymptotic variance of Nj hN (j)(π̂j − πj ). We use η̃τN = (η̃τN (1)′ , ..., η̃τN (J)′ ) for
the smoothed version of J˜N (τN ), where η̃τN (j) := η̂τN (j) + √

1
N (0, Ŝj ), j
Nj hN (j)

= 1, ..., J.

Let ḣ (ḧ) denote the ﬁrst (second) derivative of a function h. Recall that the modulus of
continuity of h deﬁned on R at x0 is given by
ω(h, t, x0 ) := sup |h(x) − h(x0 )|

s.t. |x − x0 | ≤ t
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for t > 0.
Condition 7.1. Let ϵ > 0 and K < ∞ be some constants, and ρ : [0, ∞] → [0, ∞] some function such
that ρ(t) ↓ 0 as t ↓ 0. The following holds:
(i) π ∈ C;
(ii) var(bk (j)′ dj,n |xn (j) = x(j)) ≥ ϵ holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m for some j = 1, ..., J;
(iii) xn (j) is continuously distributed with density fj , and fj (x(j)) ≥ ϵ for every 1 ≤ j ≤ J;
(
)
(iv) pi|j is twice diﬀerentiable and ω p̈i|j , t, x(j) ≤ ρ(t), t ≥ 0, sup |ṗi|j | ≤ K and sup |p¨i|j | ≤ K
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ Ij and 1 ≤ j ≤ J;

(
)
(v) fj is twice diﬀerentiable and ω f¨j , t, x(j) ≤ ρ(t), t ≥ 0, sup fj ≤ K, sup |f˙j | ≤ K and

sup |f¨j | ≤ K for every 1 ≤ j ≤ J.
In what follows, Fj signiﬁes the joint distribution of (di|j,n , xn (j)). Let F be the set of all
(F1 , ..., FJ ) that satisfy Condition 7.1 for some (ϵ, K, ρ(·)).
Corollary 7.1. Choose τN and hN (j), j = 1, ..., J so that τN ↓ 0, hN (j) = o(N − 5 ) and
1

√

N minj hN (j)τN ↑

∞. Also let Ω be diagonal where all the diagonal elements are positive. Then under Assumption 5.1
lim inf

inf

N →∞ (F1 ,...,FJ )∈F

Pr{JN ≤ ĉ1−α } = 1 − α

where ĉ1−α is the 1 − α quantile of J˜N (τN ), 0 ≤ α ≤ 21 .
The proof of Corollary 7.1 resembles the proof of Theorem 5.1, except that the asymptotic
normality proof in Bierens (1987, Section 2.2) and Condition 7.1 are used to obtain triangular array
CLT’s and uniform consistency results.
8. Empirical Application
We apply our methods to data from the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey, the same data used
by Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008, BBC henceforth). To facilitate comparison of results,
we use the same subset of these data as they do, namely the time periods from 1975 through 1999,
households with a car and at least one child, and also the same composite goods, namely food,
nondurable consumption goods, and services (with total expenditure on the three standing in for
income).
For each year, we extract the budget corresponding to that year’s median expenditure. We
estimate the distribution of demand on that budget by kernel density estimation applied to budget
shares, where the kernel is normal, the bandwidth is chosen according to Silverman’s rule of thumb,
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and the underlying distance metric is log(income). Like BBC, we assume that all consumers in one
year face the same prices, and we use their price data. While budgets have a tendency to move outward
over time, we ﬁnd that there is substantial overlap of budgets. Thus, our analysis is not subject to
the frequently reported problem that revealed preference tests are near vacuous because income gains
dominate relative price changes. At the same time, the tendency of budgets to move outward means
that budgets which are more than a few years apart rarely overlap, making the reﬁnement of our
crawling algorithm via Proposition 4.1 very powerful in this application.
It is computationally prohibitive to test stochastic rationality on 25 periods at once. We
work with all possible sets of eight consecutive periods, a problem size that can be very comfortably
computed. This leads to a collection of 18 matrices (X, A). Testing problems were of vastly diﬀerent
complexity, with the size of the matrix A ranging from (14 × 21) to (67 × 149570) and (64 × 177352);
thus, there were up to 67 patches and up to 177352 rational choice types. Over this range of problem
sizes, time required to compute A varied from negligible to several hours with the crawling algorithm.
Time required to compute the larger matrices improves by a factor of about 100 using Proposition
4.1. Time required to compute JN varied from negligible to about one minute, with problem size
(67 × 149570) being the hardest. Thus, our informal assessment is that for computation of JN ,
increasing I (and therefore the dimensionality of the quadratic programming problem’s objective
function) is more costly than increasing H (and therefore the number of linear constraints).
Figures 1 and 2 provide a visual illustration using the 1975-82 periods. Figure 1 visualizes
the relevant budget sets; Figure 2 illustrates patches on the 1982 budget set. There is substantial
overlap across budgets, with the 1975-1982 periods generating 50 distinct “patches” and a total of
42625 choice types. The reason is that due to the 1970’s recession, budgets initially contract and then
recover over this time period, generating an intricate pattern of mutual overlaps.
For each testing problem, we computed X, A, JN , as well as critical values and p-values using
the tightened bootstrap algorithm with R = 2000 resamples. Results are summarized in Table 1. We
ﬁnd that JN = 0 in only one case; that is, only in one case are the estimated choice probabilities
rationalizable. However, violations of stochastic rationality are by and large not signiﬁcant. We get
one p-value below 10%, illustrating that in principle our test has some power, though this p-value
must of course be seen in the context of the multiple hypothesis tests reported in table 1.12 Also, the
p-values seem to exhibit strong serial dependence. This is as expected – recall that any two consecutive
12An increase of the bootstrap size to 10000 (not reported) conﬁrms a p-value of under 10% for this test statistic seen

in isolation. Of course, a single rejection at the 10% level is well within expectations for joint testing of 18 hypotheses.
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periods

I

75-82 50

H

N

JN p-value 10% c.v. 5% c.v.

42625 1229

.23

96%

3.1

4.0

76-83 67 149570 1209

.25

95%

2.5

3.3

77-84 55

97378 1160

.22

94%

2.0

2.5

78-85 49

61460 1108

.22

93%

1.7

2.3

79-86 43

38521 1033

.24

69%

.76

.94

80-87 35

7067 1033

.16

77%

2.1

3.4

81-88 27

615

995

.16

62%

.67

.82

82-89 14

21

987

0

100%

.24

.34

83-90 14

21

869 .00015

50%

2.1

3.5

84-91 16

63

852

.15

71%

2.6

3.8

85-92 27

1131

852

1.75

22%

3.1

4.3

86-93 43

10088

828

2.15

17%

2.9

3.8

87-94 49

55965

828

2.59

18%

3.5

4.6

88-95 52

75318

828

2.23

15%

2.8

3.6

89-96 64 177352

795

1.61

23%

2.7

3.6

90-97 46

22365

715

1.74

9.1%

1.69

2.2

91-98 39

9400

715

2.17

16%

2.8

3.5

92-99 21
225 715
2.58
10.2%
2.6
3.4
Table 1. Numerical Results of Testing Rationality Using FES data.

p-values were computed from two subsets of data that overlap in seven of eight periods. Our overall
conclusion is that observed choice probabilities diﬀer from rationalizable ones but not signiﬁcantly so.

9. Further Applications and Extensions
9.1. Partial Identification of ν. Our setting gives rise to an identiﬁed set Hν for weights ν over
rational choice types
Hν = {ν ∈ ∆H−1 : Aν = π},
and our main test could be interpreted as a speciﬁcation test for the null hypothesis H0 : Hν ̸= ∅.
Estimation of Hν is, therefore, a natural issue. We focus on it somewhat less because the identiﬁed
set is a collection of distributions over lists of choice behaviors and, at least in our application, is not
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Figure 1. Visualization of 1975-1982 budgets

Figure 2. Visualization of ”patches” on the 1982 budget

immediately interpretable in terms of structural parameters of interest. This caveat might not apply
to other applications, however.
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If our model is misspeciﬁed, then Hν is empty. To generate an estimand that is nonempty by
construction, deﬁne
Hν (Ω) = arg min {(Aν − π)′ Ω (Aν − π)},
ν∈∆H−1

This set is independent of the choice of the weighting matrix Ω (as long as Ω is positive deﬁnite),
and then coincides with Hν as previously deﬁned, iﬀ the latter is nonempty. But it also deﬁnes a
coherent notion of “pseudo-true (partially identiﬁed) distribution of rational types” if the data are
not rationalizable.
Hν is a singleton iﬀ ν is point identiﬁed, which will rarely be the case in interesting applications
of our framework. Indeed, in our application, Hν (Ω) is a high-dimensional, convex polyhedron even in
cases where π is not rationalizable. That is, unlike in many other applications of moment inequalities,
failure of the sample criterion function to attain a minimal value of zero does not make the sample
analog of the identiﬁed set a singleton.
Explicit computation of Hν (Ω) is demanding. Our suggestion is to write
{
}
′
′
H−1
Hν (Ω) = ν ∈ ∆
: (Aν − π) Ω (Aν − π) − min {(Av − π) Ω (Av − π)} = 0
v∈∆H−1

and compute a plug-in estimator that replaces π with π
b. Noting that we showed how to compute
the inner minimum, computation of these estimators could utilize methods based on support vector
machines as developed in current work by Bar and Molinari (2012). An appropriately modiﬁed version
of the method described in Sections 5 and 6 can be applied to inference on Hν or elements of Hν ,
though we leave its detailed analysis for future research.
9.2. Partial Identification of Counterfactual Choices. The toolkit developed in this paper is
also useful for counterfactual analysis. At the most general level, to bound the value of any function
f (ν) subject to the constraint that ν rationalizes the observed data, solve the program
min / max f (ν) s.t. Aν = η̂,

ν∈RH
+

ν∈RH
+

recalling that η̂ = π̂ whenever π̂ is rationalizable.13 Some interesting applications emerge by restricting
attention to linear functions f (ν) = e′ ν, in which case the bounds are furthermore relatively easy to
compute because the program is linear. We brieﬂy discuss bounding demand under a counterfactual
13Equivalently, one could use the previous subsection’s notation to write

min / max f (v)

s.t. v ∈ Hν (Ω),

which is more similar to the way that similar problems are stated by Manski (e.g., Manski (2007)).
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budget, e.g. in order to measure the impact of policy intervention. This is close in spirit to bounds
reported by Blundell et al. (2008; see also Cherchye et al. (2009) and references therein) as well as
Manski (2007, 2013).
In this subsection only, assume that demand on budget BJ is not observed but is to be bounded.
Write



A=

A−J
AJ



,π = 

π−J
πJ




π1|J


. 
 , πJ = 
 .. 


πIJ |J


and let ei signify the i-th unit vector. We will begin by bounding components of the vector πJ .
Corollary 9.1. πi|J is bounded by
π i|J ≤ πi|J ≤ π i|J
where
π i|J
π i|J

{
}
= min e′i AJ ν
s.t. A−J ν = π−J , ν ≥ 0
{
}
= max e′i AJ ν
s.t. A−J ν = π−J , ν ≥ 0.

In this paper’s application, the patches xi|J , and hence the probabilities πi|J , are not of intrinsic
interest. However, they might be the object of interest in applications where the choice problem was
discrete to begin with. Indeed, the above is the bounding problem further analyzed in Sher at al.
(2011).
Next, let δ(J) = E[arg maxy∈BJ u(y)], thus the vector δ(J) with typical component δk (J)
denotes expected demand in choice problem BJ . Deﬁne the vectors
dk (J) : = [dk (1|J), ..., dk (IJ |J)]
dk (J) : = [dk (1|J), ..., dk (IJ |J)]
with components
dk (i|J) : = min{yk : y ∈ xi|J },

1 ≤ i ≤ IJ

dk (i|J) : = max{yk : y ∈ xi|J },

1 ≤ i ≤ IJ ,

thus these vectors list minimal respectively maximal consumption of good k on the diﬀerent patches
within BJ . Computing (dk (i|J), dk (i|J)) is a linear programming exercise. Then we have:
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Corollary 9.2. Expected demand for good k on budget BJ is bounded by
δ k (J) ≤ δk (J) ≤ δ k (J),
where
δ k (J) : = min dk (J)AJ ν

s.t.

A−J ν = πJ ,

ν≥0

δ k (J) : = max dk (J)AJ ν

s.t.

A−J ν = πJ ,

ν ≥ 0.

Finally, consider bounding the c.d.f. Fk (z) = Pr(yk ≤ z). This quantity must be bounded in
two steps. The event (yk ≤ z) will in general not correspond to a precise set of patches, that is, it is
not measurable with respect to (the algebra generated by) {x1|J , ..., xIJ |J }. An upper bound on Fk (z)
will derive from an upper bound on the joint probability of all patches xi|J s.t. yk ≤ z holds for some
y ∈ xi|J . Similarly, a lower bound will derive from bounding the joint probability of all patches xi|J
s.t. yk ≤ z holds for all y ∈ xi|J .14 We thus have:
Corollary 9.3. For k = 1, ..., K and z ≥ 0, Fk (z) is bounded from below by
∑
min
e′i AJ ν
ν∈RH
+

i∈{1,...,IJ }:
dk (i|J)≤z

s.t. A−J ν = π−J
and from above by
max

ν∈RH
+

∑

e′i AJ ν

i∈{1,...,IJ }:
dk (i|J)≤z

s.t. A−J ν = π−J ,
(
)
where dk (i|J), dk (i|J) are deﬁned as before.
While both the lower and the upper bound, seen as functions of z, will themselves be proper
c.d.f.’s, they are not in general feasible distributions of demand for yk . That is, the bounds are sharp
pointwise but not uniformly. Also, bounds on a wide range of parameters such as the variance of
demand follow from the above bounds on the c.d.f. through results in Stoye (2010). However, because
the bounds on the c.d.f. are not uniform, these derived bounds will be valid but not necessarily sharp.
When trained on this paper’s empirical application, these bounds are uncomfortably wide,
motivating the search for nonparametric reﬁnements that lead to narrower bounds without tightly
14These deﬁnitions correspond to inner and outer measure, as well as to hitting and containment probability.
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constraining heterogeneity. This search, as well as the development of inference procedures for the
bounds, are the subject of ongoing research. We also note that in his recent analysis of optimal
taxation of labor, Manski (2013) uses our computational tools to ﬁnd informative bounds.

9.3. Choice from Binary Sets. The methods developed in this paper, including the two extensions
just discussed, immediately apply to nonparametric analysis of random discrete choice. Indeed, the
initial discretization step that characterizes our analysis of a demand system is superﬂuous in this
case. We brieﬂy elaborate on one salient application that has received attention in the literature,
namely the case where choice probabilities for pairs of options,
πab := Pr(a is chosen from {a, b})
are observed for all pairs of choice objects {a, b} drawn from some ﬁnite, universal set A.
Finding abstract conditions under which a set of choice probabilities {πab : a, b ∈ A} is rationalizable has been the objective of two large, disjoint literatures, one in economics and one in operations
research. See Fishburn (1992) for a survey of these literatures and Manski (2007) for a recent discussion of the substantive problem. There exists a plethora of necessary conditions, most famously
Marschak’s (1960) triangle condition, which can be written as
πab + πbc + πca ≤ 2, ∀a, b, c ∈ A.
This condition is also suﬃcient for rationalizability if A contains at most 5 elements (Dridi (1980)).
Conditions that are both necessary and suﬃcient in general have proved elusive. We do not discover
abstract such conditions either, but provide the toolkit to numerically resolve the question in complicated cases, including a statistical test that applies whenever probabilities are estimated rather than
perfectly observed. To see this, deﬁne J = (#A)(#A − 1)/2 “budgets” that correspond to distinct
pairs a, b ∈ A, and let the vector X (of length I = 2J) stack these budgets, where the ordering of
budgets is arbitrary and options within a budget are ordered according to a preassigned ordering on
A. Each rational type (and thus, column of the matrix A) then corresponds to an ordering of the
elements of A and can be characterized by a binary I-vector with just the same interpretation as
before. As before, an I-vector of choice probabilities π whose components correspond to components
of X is rationalizable iﬀ Aν = π for some ν ∈ ∆H−1 . All methods developed in this paper apply
immediately.
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To illustrate, let A = {a, b, c}, then one can write
 
 

π
a
ab
 
 
1
 
 

b
πba 
0
 
 

 
 

b
 πbc 
1




X =  ,π =  ,A = 

c
 πcb 
0
 
 

 
 

πca 
0
c
 
 

a
πac
1


1 1 0 0 0

0 0 1 1 1


0 0 1 1 0
,

1 1 0 0 1


1 0 1 0 1

0 1 0 1 0

and it is readily veriﬁed that Aν = π for some ν ∈ ∆5 iﬀ both πab +πbc +πca ≤ 2 and πcb +πba +πac ≤ 2,
conﬁrming suﬃciency of the triangle condition. More generally, the matrix A has H = (#A)! columns.
This limits computational feasibility of our approach, but note that the set of orderings of elements
of A is easily characterized, so that computation time per column of A will be low.
10. Conclusion
This paper presented asymptotic theory and computational tools for nonparametric testing of
Random Utility Models. Again, the null to be tested was that data were generated by a RUM, interpreted as describing a heterogeneous population, where the only restrictions imposed on individuals’
behavior were “more is better” and SARP. In particular, we allowed for unrestricted, unobserved
heterogeneity and stopped far short of assumptions that would recover invertibility of demand. As
a result, the distribution over utility functions in the population is left (very) underidentiﬁed. We
showed that testing the model is nonetheless possible. The method is easily adapted to choice problems that are discrete to begin with, and one can easily impose more, or also fewer, restrictions at the
individual level.
Possibilities for extensions and reﬁnements abound. We close by mentioning some salient issues.
(1) The methods discussed in this section are computationally intensive. The proposed algorithms
work for a reasonably sized problem, though it is important to make further improvements in the
algorithms if one wishes to deal with a problem that is large, say in terms of the number of budgets.
(2) We restricted attention to ﬁnite sets of budgets. The extension to inﬁnitely many budgets would
be of obvious interest. Theoretically, it can be handled by considering an appropriate discretization
argument (McFadden (2005)). For the proposed projection-based econometric methodology, such an
extension requires evaluating choice probabilities locally over points in the space of p via nonparametric
smoothing, then use the choice probability estimators in the calculation of the JN statistic. The
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asymptotic theory then needs to be modiﬁed. Another approach that can mitigate the computational
constraint is to consider a partition of the space of p such that RK
+ = P1 ∪ P2 · · · ∪ PM . Suppose we
1 , · · · , JM,
calculate the JN statistic for each of these partitions. Given the resulting M statistics, say JN
N
max := max
m
we can consider JN
1≤m≤M JN or a weighted average of them. These extensions and their

formal statistical analysis are of practical interest.
(3) It might frequently be desirable to control for observable covariates to guarantee the homogeneity
of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Once again, this requires incorporating nonparametric
smoothing in estimating choice probabilities, then averaging the corresponding JN statistics over the
covariates. This extension will be pursued.
(4) The econometric techniques outlined here can be potentially useful in much broader contexts.
Again, our proposed hypothesis test can be regarded as speciﬁcation test for a moment inequalities model. The proposed statistic JN is an inequality analogue of goodness-of-ﬁt statistics such as
Hansen’s (1982) overidentifying restrictions test statistic. Existing proposals for speciﬁcation testing in moment inequality models (Andrews and Guggenberger (2009), Andrews and Soares (2010),
Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2013), Romano and Shaikh (2008)) use a similar test statistic but work with
H-representations. In settings in which theoretical restrictions inform a V-representation of a cone,
the H-representation will typically not be available in practice. We expect that our method can be
used in many such cases.

11. Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We begin with some preliminary observations. Throughout this proof,
c(Bi ) denotes the object actually chosen from budget Bi .
(i) If there is a choice cycle of any ﬁnite length, then there is a cycle of length 2 or 3 (where
a cycle of length 2 is a WARP violation). To see this, assume there exists a length N choice cycle
c(Bi ) ≻ c(Bj ) ≻ c(Bk ) ≻ ... ≻ c(Bi ). If c(Bk ) ≻ c(Bi ), then a length 3 cycle has been discovered.
Else, there exists a length N − 1 choice cycle c(Bi ) ≻ c(Bk ) ≻ ... ≻ c(Bi ). The argument can be
iterated until N = 4.
(ii) Call a length 3 choice cycle irreducible if it does not contain a length 2 cycle. Then a choice
pattern is rationalizable iﬀ it contains no length 2 cycles and also no irreducible length 3 cycles. (In
particular, one can ignore reducible length 3 cycles.) This follows trivially from (i).
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(iii) Let J = 3 and M = 1, i.e. assume there are three budgets but two of them fail to
intersect. Then any length 3 cycle is reducible. To see this, assume w.l.o.g. that B1 is below B3 ,
thus c(B3 ) ≻ c(B1 ) by monotonicity. If there is a choice cycle, we must have c(B1 ) ≻ c(B2 ) ≻ c(B3 ).
c(B1 ) ≻ c(B2 ) implies that c(B2 ) is below B1 , thus it is below B3 . c(B2 ) ≻ c(B3 ) implies that c(B3 )
is below B2 . Thus,choice from (B2 , B3 ) violates WARP.
We are now ready to prove the main result. The nontrivial direction is “only if,” thus it suﬃces
to show the following: If choice from (B1 , ..., BJ−1 ) is rationalizable but choice from (B1 , ..., BJ ) is
not, then choice from (BM +1 , ..., BJ ) cannot be rationalizable. By observation (ii), if (B1 , ..., BJ )
is not rationalizable, it contains either a 2-cycle or an irreducible 3-cycle. Because choice from all
triplets within (B1 , ..., BJ−1 ) is rationalizable by assumption, it is either the case that some (Bi , BJ )
constitutes a 2-cycle or that some triplet (Bi , Bk , BJ ), where i < k w.l.o.g., reveals an irreducible
choice cycle. In the former case, Bi must intersect BJ , hence i > M , hence the conclusion. In the
latter case, if k ≤ M , the choice cycle must be a 2-cycle in (Bi , Bk ), contradicting rationalizability of
(B1 , ..., BJ−1 ). If i ≤ M , the choice cycle is reducible by (iii). Thus, i > M , hence the conclusion. 
Proof of Lemma 5.1. By the Minkowski-Weyl theorem
C = {t ∈ RI : Bt ≤ 0}.
Letting ντ = ν − τ 1H , we have
Cτ

= {Aν|ντ ≥ 0}
= {A[ντ + τ 1H ]|ντ ≥ 0}
= C ⊕ τ A1H
= {t : t − τ A1H ∈ C}

where ⊕ signiﬁes Minkowski sum. Deﬁne
ϕ = −BA1H .
Using the H-representation of C,
Cτ

= {t : B(t − τ A1H ) ≤ 0}
= {t : Bt ≤ −τ ϕ}.
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Note that the above deﬁnition of ϕ implies ϕ ∈ col(B). Also deﬁne
Φ := −BA

b′
 1
 .
= −  ..

b′m
=




 [a1 , · · · , aH ]


{Φkh }

where Φkh = b′k ah , 1 ≤ k ≤ m, 1 ≤ h ≤ H and let eh be the h-th standard unit vector in RH . Since
eh ≥ 0, the V-representation of C implies that Aeh ∈ C, and thus
BAeh ≤ 0
by its H-representation. Therefore
(11.1)

Φkh = −e′k BAeh ≥ 0,

1 ≤ k ≤ m, 1 ≤ h ≤ H.

Write ϕ = (ϕ1 , ..., ϕm )′ . We now show that ϕk ̸= 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m. To see it, note
ϕ = Φ1H
 ∑
H
h=1 Φ1h

..

= 
.

∑H
h=1 Φmh







But unless we have the case of rank(B) = 1 (in which case the proof is trivial) it cannot be that
aj ∈ {x : b′k x = 0}

for all j

Therefore for each k, Φkh = b′k ah is nonzero at least for one h, 1 ≤ h ≤ H. Since (11.1) implies that
all of {Φkh }H
h=1 are non-negative, we conclude that
ϕk =

H
∑

Φkh > 0

h=1

for all k. We now have
Cτ = {t : Bt ≤ −τ ϕ},

ϕ>0

where the strict vector inequality is meant to hold element-by-element.
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Proof of Theorem 5.1. By applying the Minkowski-Weyl theorem and Lemma 5.1 to JN and J˜N (τN ),
we see that our procedure is equivalent to comparing
JN =

min

t∈RI :Bt≤0

N [π̂ − t]′ Ω[π̂ − t]

to the 1 − α quantile of the distribution of
J˜N (τN ) =
with ϕ ∈

Rm
++ ,

min

t∈RI :Bt≤−τ

Nϕ

N [η̃τN − t]′ Ω[η̃τN − t]

where

η̂τN

1
η̃τN = η̂τN + √ N (0, Ŝ),
N
=
argmin N [π̂ − t]′ Ω[π̂ − t].
t∈RI :Bt≤−τN ϕ

Suppose B has m rows and rank(B) = ℓ. Deﬁne an ℓ × m matrix K such that KB is a matrix whose
rows consist of a basis of the row space row(B). Also let M be an (I − ℓ) × I matrix whose rows form
( )
an orthonormal basis of kerB = ker(KB), and deﬁne P = KB
M . Finally, let ĝ = B π̂ and ĥ = M π̂.
Then

[(

JN

)
]′
[(
)
]
KB
KB
−1 ′
−1
= min N
(π̂ − t) P ΩP
(π̂ − t)
Bt≤0
M
M
(
)
(
)
K[ĝ − Bt] ′ −1 ′
−1 K[ĝ − Bt]
= min N
P ΩP
.
Bt≤0
ĥ − M t
ĥ − M t

Let

{( )
}
Kγ
I
U1 =
: γ = Bt, h = M t, Bt ≤ 0, t ∈ R
h
then writing α = KBt and h = M t,
(
)
(
)
K ĝ − α ′ −1 ′
−1 K ĝ − α
JN = min N
P ΩP
.
ĥ − h
ĥ − h
(αh)∈U1
Also deﬁne

{( )
}
Kγ
: γ ≤ 0, γ ∈ col(B), h ∈ RI−ℓ
h
where col(B) denotes the column space of B. Obviously U1 ⊂ U2 . Moreover, U2 ⊂ U1 holds. To see
( ∗)
this, let Kγ
be an arbitrary element of U2 . We can always ﬁnd t∗ ∈ RI such that Kγ ∗ = KBt∗ .
h∗
U2 =

Deﬁne
t∗∗ := t∗ + M ′ h∗ − M ′ M t∗
then Bt∗∗ = Bt∗ = γ ∗ ≤ 0 and M t∗∗ = M t∗ + M M ′ h∗ − M M ′ M t∗ = h∗ , therefore
of U1 as well. Consequently,
U1 = U2 .

(Kγ ∗ )
h∗

is an element
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We now have
JN

Deﬁne

(
)
)
(
K ĝ − α ′ −1 ′
−1 K ĝ − α
= min N
P ΩP
ĥ − h
ĥ − h
(αh)∈U2
(
)
(
)′
K ĝ − α
−1 ′
−1 K ĝ − α
.
= N min
P ΩP
y
y
(αy)∈U2

( )′
( )
x
−1 ′
−1 x
T (x, y) =
P ΩP
,
y
y

x ∈ Rℓ , y ∈ RI−ℓ ,

and
t(x) := min T (x, y),
y∈RI−ℓ

s(g) :=

min
γ≤0,γ∈col(B)

t(K[g − γ]).

It is easy to see that t : Rℓ → R+ is a positive deﬁnite quadratic form. We can write
JN

= N

min
γ≤0,γ∈col(B)

t(K[ĝ − γ])

= N s(ĝ)
√
= s( N ĝ).
We now show that tightening can turn non-binding inequality constraints into binding ones but not
vice versa. Note that, as will be seen below, this observation uses diagonality of Ω and the speciﬁc
geometry of the cone C. Let γ̂τkN , ĝ k and ϕk denote the k-th elements of γ̂τN = B η̂τN , ĝ and ϕ.
Moreover, deﬁne γτ (g) = [γ 1 (g), ..., γ m (g)]′ = argminγ≤−τ ϕ,γ∈col(B) t(K[g − γ]) for g ∈ col(B). Then
γ̂τN = γτN (ĝ). Finally, deﬁne βτ (g) = γτ (g) + τ ϕ for τ > 0 and let βτk (g) denote its k-th element. Now
we show that for each k and for some δ > 0,
βτk (g) = 0
if |g k | ≤ τ δ and g j ≤ τ δ, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. In what follows we ﬁrst show this for the case with Ω = II , where
II denotes the I-dimensional identity matrix, then generalize the result to the case where Ω can have
arbitrary positive diagonal elements.
For τ > 0 deﬁne hyperplanes
Hkτ = {x : b′k x = −τ ϕk }, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, τ > 0,
and half spaces
τ
H∠k
(δ) = {x : b′k x ≤ τ δ}, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, τ > 0,

and also let
Sk (δ) = {x ∈ C : |b′k x| ≤ τ δ}
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for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, δ > 0. In what follows we show that for small enough δ > 0, every element x∗ ∈ RI
such that
(11.2)

τ
τ
x∗ ∈ S1 (δ) ∩ · · · ∩ Sq (δ) ∩ H∠q+1
(δ) ∩ · · · H∠m
(δ) for some q ∈ {1, ..., m}

satisﬁes
(11.3)

x∗ |Cτ ∈ H1τ ∩ · · · ∩ Hqτ

where x∗ |Cτ denotes the orthogonal projection of x∗ on Cτ . Let g ∗ k = b′k x∗ , k = 1, ..., m. Note that
an element x∗ fulﬁls (11.2) iﬀ |g ∗ k | ≤ τ δ, 1 ≤ k ≤ q and g ∗ j ≤ τ δ, q + 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Likewise, (11.3)
holds iﬀ βkτ (g ∗ ) = 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ c. Thus in order to establish the desired property of the function βτ (·),
we show that (11.2) implies (11.3). Suppose it does not hold; then without loss of generality, for an
element x∗ that satisﬁes (11.2) for an arbitrary small δ > 0, we have
(11.4)

x∗ |Cτ ∈ H1τ ∩ · · · ∩ Hrτ

and

x∗ |Cτ ∈
/ Hjτ , r + 1 ≤ j ≤ q

for some 1 ≤ r ≤ q − 1. Deﬁne halfspaces
τ
H∠k
= {x : b′k x ≤ −τ ϕk },

1 ≤ k ≤ m, τ > 0,

hyperplanes
Hk = {x : b′k x = 0}, 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
and also let
F = H1 ∩ · · · ∩ Hr ∩ C,
then for (11.4) to hold for some x∗ ∈ RI satisfying (11.2) for an arbitrary small δ > 0 we must have
τ
τ
F | (H1τ ∩ · · · ∩ Hrτ ) ⊂ int(H∠r+1
∩ · · · ∩ H∠q
)

(Recall the notation | signiﬁes orthogonal projection. Also note that if dim(F) = 1, then F = ∩qj=1 Hjτ ,
and (11.4) does not occur.) Therefore if we let
∆(J) = {x ∈ RI : 1′I x = J, x ≥ 0},
i.e. the simplex with vertices (J, 0, · · · , 0), · · · , (0, · · · , 0, J), we have
(11.5)

τ
τ
(F ∩ ∆(J)) | (H1τ ∩ · · · ∩ Hrτ ) ⊂ int(H∠r+1
∩ · · · ∩ H∠q
).
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Let {a1 , ..., aH } = A denote the collection of the column vectors of A. Then {the vertices of F ∩
¯ ∈ F ∩ ∆(J). Let B(ε, x) denote the ε-(open) ball with center x ∈ RI . By (11.5),
∆(J)} ∈ A. Let ā, ā
( (
))
τ
τ
B ε, ā| ∩rj=1 Hjτ ⊂ int(H∠r+1
∩ · · · ∩ H∠q
) ∩ H∠1 ∩ · · · ∩ H∠r
¯τ := ā
¯ + τ , then
holds for small enough ε > 0. Let āτ := ā + τ , ā
((

)
)′
((
)
)′ τ
¯ − ā) =
¯ − āτ )
ā| ∩rj=1 Hjτ − ā (ā
ā| ∩rj=1 Hjτ − ā (ā
= 0

))
( (
¯ − ā) < 0. By
¯τ ∈ ∩rj=1 Hjτ . We can then take z ∈ B ε, ā| ∩rj=1 Hjτ
such that (z − ā)′ (ā
since āτ , ā
¯) of distinct elements in A such
construction z ∈ C, which implies the existence of a triplet (a, ā, ā
¯ − ā) < 0. In what follows we show that this cannot happen, then the desired property
that (a − ā)′ (ā
of βτ is established.
So let us now show that
(11.6)

(a1 − a0 )′ (a2 − a0 ) ≥ 0 for every triplet (a0 , a1 , a2 ) of distinct elements in A.

Noting that a′i aj just counts the number of budgets on which i and j agree, deﬁne
ϕ(ai , aj ) = J − a′i aj ,
the number of disagreements. Importantly, note that ϕ(ai , aj ) = ϕ(aj , ai ) and that ϕ is a distance (it
is the taxicab distance between elements in A, which are all 0-1 vectors). Now
(a1 − a0 )′ (a2 − a0 )
= a′1 a2 − a′0 a2 − a′1 a0 + a′0 a0
= J − ϕ(a1 , a2 ) − (J − ϕ(a0 , a2 )) − (J − ϕ(a0 , a1 )) + J
= ϕ(a0 , a2 ) + ϕ(a0 , a1 ) − ϕ(a1 , a2 ) ≥ 0
by the triangle inequality.
Next we treat the case where Ω is not necessarily II . Write


ω12 0 . . . 0




 0 ω22 . . . 0 
.

Ω=

..


.


0 . . . 0 ωI2
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The statistic JN in (3.1) can be rewritten, using the square-root matrix Ω1/2 ,
JN =

min

η ∗ =Ω1/2 η:η∈C

[π̂ ∗ − η ∗ ]′ [π̂ ∗ − η ∗ ]

or
JN = min
[π̂ ∗ − η ∗ ]′ [π̂ ∗ − η ∗ ]
∗
∗
η ∈C

where
C ∗ = {Ω1/2 Aν|ν ≥ 0}
= {A∗ ν|ν ≥ 0}
with
A∗ = [a∗1 , ..., a∗H ], a∗h = Ω1/2 ah , 1 ≤ h ≤ H.
Then we can follow our previous argument replacing a’s with a∗ ’s, and using
∆∗ (J) = conv([0, ..., ωi , ....0]′ ∈ RI , i = 1, ..., I).
instead of the simplex ∆(J). Finally, we need to verify that the acuteness condition (11.6) holds for
A∗ = {a∗1 , ..., a∗H }.
For two I-vectors a and b, deﬁne a weighted taxicab metric
ϕΩ (a, b) :=

I
∑

ωi |ai − bi |,

i=1

then the standard taxicab metric ϕ used above is ϕΩ with Ω = II . Moreover, letting a∗ = Ω1/2 a and
b∗ = Ω1/2 b, where each of a and b is an I-dimensional 0-1 vector, we have
∗′ ∗

a b =

I
∑

ωi [1 − |ai − bi |] = ω̄ − ϕΩ (a, b)

i=1

with ω̄ =

∑I

i=1 ωi .

Then for every triplet (a∗0 , a∗1 , a∗2 ) of distinct elements in A∗

(a∗1 − a∗0 )′ (a∗2 − a∗0 ) = ω̄ − ϕΩ (a1 , a2 ) − ω̄ + ϕΩ (a0 , a2 ) − ω̄ + ϕΩ (a0 , a1 ) + ω̄ − ϕΩ (a0 , a0 )
= ϕΩ (a1 , a2 ) − ϕΩ (a0 , a2 ) − ϕΩ (a0 , a1 )
≥ 0,
which is the desired acuteness condition. Since JN can be written as the minimum of the quadratic
form with identity-matrix weighting subject to the cone generated by a∗ ’s, all the previous arguments
developed for the case with Ω = II remain valid.
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Deﬁning ξ ∼ N(0, Ŝ) and ζ = Bξ,
[(
[(
)
]′
)
]
KB
KB
−1/2
−1 ′
−1
−1/2
˜
JN (τN ) ∼
min N
(η̂τN + N
ξ − t) P ΩP
(η̂τN + N
ξ − t)
Bt≤−τN ϕ
M
M
( [
])
= N
min
t K γ̂τN + N −1/2 ζ − γ .
γ≤−τN ϕ,γ∈col(B)

Moreover, deﬁning γ τ = γ + τN ϕ in the above, and using the deﬁnitions of βτ (·) and s(·)
J˜N (τN ) ∼ N
= N
= N

min

( [
])
t K γ̂τN + τN ϕ + N −1/2 ζ − γ τ

min

( [
])
t K γτN (ĝ) + τN ϕ + N −1/2 ζ − γ τ

min

( [
])
t K βτN (ĝ) + N −1/2 ζ − γ τ

γ τ ≤0,γ τ ∈col(B)
γ τ ≤0,γ τ ∈col(B)
γ τ ≤0,γ τ ∈col(B)

(
)
= s N 1/2 βτN (ĝ) + ζ
Let φN (ξ) := N 1/2 βτN (τN ξ) for ξ = (ξ1 , ..., ξm )′ ∈ col(B), then from the property of βτ shown above,
its k-th element φkN satisﬁes
φkN (ξ) = 0
if |ξ k | ≤ δ and ξ j ≤ δ, 1 ≤ j ≤ m for large enough N . Deﬁne ξˆ := ĝ/τN and using the deﬁnition of
φN , we write
(11.7)

)
(
ˆ +ζ .
J˜N (τN ) ∼ s φτN (ξ)

Now we invoke Theorem 1 of AS10. As noted before, the function t is a positive deﬁnite quadratic
form on Rℓ , and so is its restriction on col(B). Then Assumptions 1-3 of AS10 hold for the function
s deﬁned above if signs are adjusted appropriately as our formulae deal with negativity constraints
whereas AS10 is formulated for positivity constraints (note that Assumption 1(b) does not apply here
since we use a ﬁxed weighting matrix). The function φN in (11.7) satisﬁes the properties of φ in AS10
used in their proof of Theorem 1. AS10 imposes a set of restrictions on the parameter space (see their
Equation (2.2) on page 124). Their condition (2.2) (vii) is a Lyapunov condition for a triangular array
′ , ..., π ′ ]′ , N = 1, 2, ... in P ∩ C
CLT. Following AS10, consider a sequence of distributions πN = [π1N
JN
√
√
such that (1) N BπN → h for a non-positive h as N → ∞ and (2) CovπN ( N B π̂) → Σ as N → ∞

where Σ is positive semideﬁnite. As πN ∈ P, Condition 5.1 demands that varπjN (bk (j)′ dj,n ) ≥ ϵ holds
for some j for each N . Therefore we have limN →∞ varπjN (bk (j)′ dj,n ) ≥ ϵ for some j. For such j,
√
the Lindeberg condition for CLT holds for N (j)[b1 (j)′ [π̂j − πjN (j) ], ..., bm (j)′ [π̂j − πjN (j) ]]′ where
√
πN
π̂j = [π̂1|j , ..., π̂Ij |j ]′ , and we have N B(π̂ − πN ) ;
N (0, Σ). The other conditions (2.2)(i)-(vi) hold
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trivially. Finally, Assumptions GMS 2 and GMS 4 of AS10 are concerned with their thresholding
parameter κN for the k-th moment inequality, and by letting κN = N 1/2 τN ϕk , the former holds by
√
the condition N τN ↑ ∞ and the latter by τN ↓ 0. Therefore we conclude
lim inf inf Pr{JN ≤ ĉ1−α } = 1 − α.
N →∞ π∈P∩C


Before stating the proof of Corollary 7.1, let us introduce some notation.
Notation. Let B (j) := [b1 (j), ..., bk (j)]′ ∈ Rk×Ij . For F ∈ F and 1 ≤ j ≤ J, deﬁne
(j)

pF (x) := EF [dj,n |xn (j) = x],

(j)

(j)

πF = pF (x(j)),

(1) ′

(J) ′

πF = [πF , ..., πF ]′

and
(j)

ΣF (x) := CovF [dj,n |xn (j) = x].
(j)

Also let fF denote the density of xn (j) under F .
(
)
(j)
(j)
(j)
(j)
Note that ΣF (x) = diag pF (x) − pF (x)pF (x)′ . The following is used in the proof of
Corollary 7.1:
Proposition 11.1. If Conditions 7.1(iv) and (v) hold for some K < ∞ and ρ such that ρ(t) → 0 as
(j)
(j)
(j)
(j)
(j)
(j)
t → 0, then {pF ∈F }, {ṗF ∈F }, {p̈F ∈F }, {fF ∈F }, {f˙F ∈F }, and {f¨F ∈F } are equicontinuous at x(j) for

all 1 ≤ j ≤ J.
The proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
Proof of Corollary 7.1. The proof follows the same steps as those in the proof of Theorem 5.1,
except for the treatment of π̂. Therefore, instead of the sequence πN , N = 1, 2, ... in P ∩ C, consider
√
a sequence of distributions FN = [F1N , ..., FJN ], N = 1, 2, ... in F such that (1) N hN BπFN → h for
(j)

a non-positive h as N → ∞; (2) ΣFN (x(j)) → Σ(j) (x(j)) as N → ∞, 1 ≤ j ≤ J where Σ(j) is positive
(j)

semideﬁnite; and (3) fFN (x(j)) → f (j) (x(j)) as N → ∞, 1 ≤ j ≤ J.
Deﬁne
1
vN,n (j) = √ K
hN

(

xn (j) − x(j)
hN

)
(j)

B (j) [dj,n − pFN (xn (j))],

then
(11.8)

EFN [vN,n (j)] = 0,

1 ≤ j ≤ J.
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By the standard change of variable argument
∫
′ (j)
(j)
CovFN (vN,n (j)) = B (j) ΣFN (x(j) + hN z)B (j) fFN (x(j) + hN z)K 2 (z)dz
∫
′(j)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ J. Let ∆ := CovFN (vN,n (j)) − B (j) Σ(j) (x(j))B (j) (x(j)) K 2 (z)dz, then
∫
[
]
′ (j)
(j)
∆ =
B (j) ΣFN (x(j) + hN z) − Σ(j) (x(j)) B (j) fFN (x(j) + hN z)K 2 (z)dz
∫ [
]
(j)
(j) (j)
(j) ′
+B ΣFN (x(j))B
fFN (x(j) + hN z) − f (j) (x(j)) K 2 (z)dz,
but as N → ∞
(j)

ΣFN (x(j) + hN z) − Σ(j) (x(j))
(j)

(j)

(j)

≤ ΣFN (x(j) + hN z) − ΣFN (x(j)) + ΣFN (x(j)) − Σ(j) (x(j))
(j)

(j)

(j)

≤ sup ΣF (x(j) + hN z) − ΣF (x(j)) + ΣFN (x(j)) − Σ(j) (x(j))
F ∈F

→ 0 for every z
where the convergence holds by Proposition 11.1. Similarly, as N → ∞
(j)

fFN (x(j) + hN z) − f (j) (x(j)) → 0 for every z.
By the Bounded Convergence Theorem conclude that
∆ → 0.

(11.9)

This means that a version of equation (2.2.10) in Bierens (1987) still holds even under the sequence
of distributions {FN }∞
N =1 as speciﬁed above.
We next verify the Lyapunov condition. As FN ∈ F, Condition 7.1(ii) demands that
varFjN (bk (j)′ dj,n |xn = x(j)) ≥ ϵ
holds for some j for each N . Thus we have limN →∞ varFjN (bk (j)′ dj,n |xn = x(j)) ≥ ϵ for some j.
)
(∑
N
Deﬁne s2N := CovFN
v
(i|j)
for such j where vN,n (i|j) denotes the i-th element of the Ij
n=1 N,n
random vector vN,n (j). Note that sN ≍ Nj , and therefore proceeding as in the derivation of (11.9),
then using Equation (2.2.10) in Bierens (1987) we obtain
(11.10)

Nj
1 ∑

s2+δ
Nj

n=1

EFN [|vN,n (i|j)|2+δ ] → 0
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for 1 ≤ i ≤ Ij . By (11.8), (11.9) and (11.10), we have
Nj
1 ∑
FN
√
vNj ,n (j) ;
N (0, Ω1 ),
Nj n=1

′

∫

Ω1 = B (j) Σ(j) (x(j))B (j) f (j) (x(j))

K 2 (z)dz.

Finally, the convergence results corresponding (2.2.4) and (2.2.5) in Bierens (1987) hold under the
sequence of distributions {FN }∞
N =1 as speciﬁed above, once again by proceeding as in the derivation
of (11.9). It follows that
√

Nj hN B

(j)

FN

[π̂j − πFN ] ; N (0, Ω2 ),

1
′
Ω2 = (j)
B (j) Σ(j) (x(j))B (j)
f (x(j))

The rest is the same as the proof of Theorem 5.1.

∫
K 2 (z)dz.


12. Appendix B: Algorithms for Computing A
This appendix algorithms for computation of A. The ﬁrst algorithm is a brute-force approach
that generates all possible choice patterns and then veriﬁes which of these are rationalizable. The
second one avoids the construction of the vast majority of possible choice patterns because it checks
for rationality along the way as choice patterns are constructed. The third algorithm uses proposition
1. To give a sense of the algorithms’ performance, the matrix A corresponding to the 1975-1982
data, which is of size [50 × 42625] and cannot be computed with our implementation of algorithm
1, computes in about 2 hours with our implementation of algorithm 2, and (after suitable rearrangement of budgets) in about 2 minutes with our implementation of algorithm 3. All implementations are in MATLAB and are available from the authors. The instruction to FW-test a sequence
refers to use of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm to detect choice cycles. We use the FastFloyd implementation due to Dustin Arendt (http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/ﬁleexchange/25776vectorized-ﬂoyd-warshall/content/FastFloyd.m).

Algorithm 1: Brute Force
This algorithm is easiest described verbally. First generate a matrix Amax that contains all
logically possible choice patterns. To do so, let E i denote the set of unit vectors in Ri and observe
that a stacked vector (a′1 , ..., a′J )′ is a column of Amax iﬀ (a1 , ..., aJ ) ∈ E I1 × ... × E IJ . It is then easy
to construct Amax by looping. Next, generate A by FM-testing every column of Amax and retaining
only columns that pass.

Algorithm 2: Decision Tree Crawling
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An intuition for this algorithm is as follows. All possible choice patterns can be arranged on
one decision tree, where the ﬁrst node refers to choice from B1 and so forth. The tree is systematically
crawled. Exploration of any branch is stopped as soon as a choice cycle is detected. Completion of a
rationalizable choice pattern is detected when a terminal node has been reached.
Pseudo-code for this algorithm follows.

1.

Initialize m1 = ... = mJ = 1.

2.

Initialize l = 2.

3.

Set c(B1 ) = m1 , ..., c(Bl ) = ml .

4.

If no cycle is detected, move to step 5.

FW-test (c(B1 ), ..., c(Bl )).
Else:

4a.

If ml < Il , set ml = ml + 1 and return to step 3.

4b.

If ml = Il and ml−1 < Il−1 , set ml = 1, ml−1 = ml−1 + 1, l = l − 1, and return

to step 3.
4c.

If ml = Il , ml−1 = Il−1 , and ml−2 < Il−2 , set ml = ml−1 = 1, ml−2 = ml−2 + 1,

l = l − 2, and return to step 3.
(...)
4z.

Terminate.

5.

If l < J, set l = l + 1, ml = 1, and return to step 3.

6.

Extend A by the column [m1 , ..., mJ ]′ .

Also:

6a.

If mJ < IJ , set mJ = mJ + 1 and return to step 3.

6b.

If mJ = IJ and mJ−1 < IJ−1 , set mJ = 1, mJ−1 = mJ−1 + 1, l = J − 1, and

return to step 3.
6c.

If ml = Il , ml−1 = Il−1 , and ml−2 < Il−2 , set ml = ml−1 = 1, ml−2 = ml−2 + 1,

l = l − 2, and return to step 3.
(...)
6z.

Terminate.

Algorithm 3: Refinement using Proposition 4.1
Let budgets be arranged s.t. (B1 , ..., BM ) do not intersect BJ ; for exposition of the algorithm,
assume BJ is above these budgets. Then pseudo-code for an algorithm that exploits proposition 1
(calling either of the preceding algorithms for intermediate steps) is as follows.
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1.

Use brute force or crawling to compute a matrix AM +1→J−1 corresponding to

budgets (BM +1 , ..., BJ ), though using the full X corresponding to budgets (B1 , ..., BJ ).15
2.

For each column aM +1→J−1 of AM +1→J−1 , go through the following steps:

2.1 Compute (by brute force or crawling) all vectors a1→M s.t.
(a1→M , aM +1,J−1 ) is rationalizable.
2.2 Compute (by brute force or crawling) all vectors
aJ s.t.

(aM +1,J−1 , aJ ) is rationalizable.

2.3 All stacked vectors (a′1→M , a′M +1,J−1 , a′J )′ are valid columns of A.
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